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Abstract 
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1.  Introduction 
After falling in the late  1980s, the Japanese trade surplus has been on the 
rise recently. Since  1990, the merchandise trade surplus has soared from just 
over $60 billion to more than $145 billion. Mirroring this has been new deteri- 
oration in the trade and current account positions of the United States, the EC, 
and increasingly the Asian developing countries.  While the recent surge is partly 
attributable to  the sharp  slowdown in  Japan,  the long-run persistence  of the 
surplus has economists and policymakers scratching their heads.  Why has ad- 
justment been so slow? Will the belated yen appreciation finally make a differ- 
ence? Can the surplus be eliminated through macroeconomic policies alone,  or 
will managed trade policies or other structural change be required? 
In this paper, we discuss the development of the Japanese trade surplus and 
evaluate macroeconomic policies that might be used to address it. After briefly 
describing the extent of the surplus problem, we review theoretical approaches 
to  trade  and  current  account adjustment and  discuss  their  implications for 
Japanese surplus reduction. We then describe an empirical model that we use 
to  evaluate alternative adjustment policies.  Simulations of yen appreciation 
and an accommodating Japanese fiscal stimulus suggest that macro policies 
are not a particularly powerful tool for resolving the imbalance problem. 
2.  The intractable  Japanese surplus 
The Japanese trade surplus has been  a festering political problem for the 
past decade. After maintaining approximate trade balance during the period 
of rapid  post-war  development, Japan's  surplus  began  to  grow during the 
1970s. The trade imbalance became a  major concern in the US  during the 
early 1980s, when America went from a  position of modest current account 
surpluses to significant deficits, as a result of the marked appreciation of the 
dollar after  1978 and sharp fiscal expansion under the Reagan Administra- 
tion. The Japanese trade surplus reached almost $100 billion dollars by 1986 
(see Fig. 1), the bilateral deficit with the US contributing roughly a half, 
The  Japanese  surplus  "problem" receded  from view in  the  late  1980s. The 
dollar  collapse  of  1985-1986,  together  with  an  investment  boom  in  Japan, 
helped  to  reduce  the surplus  considerably.  After  J-curve  delays,  the Japanese 
trade surplus  fell to just over $60 billion  dollars by 1990. The US share of the 
remaining deficit  was  also  smaller.  It appeared  that the surplus  problem had 
been licked. 
Beginning with the end of the  bubble economy, and  the subsequent  eco- 
nomic recovery in the US, the Japanese trade surplus  began to grow once more. 
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Fig.  1.  Japan's merchandise trade surplus. 
the  West  were  soon  decrying the  surplus  and  the  uncompetitive  Japanese 
practices that allegedly underlay it. Despite the surge, the yen remained fairly 
weak against the dollar, and there was little sign of an imminent recovery in 
Japan.  Finally,  in  1993,  1994  and  early  1995,  the  yen  began  to  appreciate 
sharply, lending hope that the trade surge might at last be reversed. Whether 
that  will  indeed  be  the  case  depends  on  the  permanence  of the  currency 
movements,  their  impact  on  the  equilibrium  determinants  of  trade  flows, 
and  the  extent  to  which  other  government  policies  are  altered  to  facilitate 
adjustment. 
While the Japanese surplus shows no immediate signs of abating, the prob- 
lem is certainly not as bad as recent numbers suggest. The surplus  since  1991 
has been driven upward by the severe and extended Japanese economic down- 
turn. Once growth and imports revive, the surplus  is likely to fall back some- 
what. (For calendar year 1994, the merchandise trade balance fell 7.3% meas- 
ured  in  yen,  although  it  still  rose  3%  in  dollar  terms,  to  $146  billion.)  Our 
concern is with the trade surplus that will almost certainly remain, why such a 
large surplus  has  persisted, and  the potential for yen appreciation  and  other 
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3.  Trade and current account adjustment in theoretical models 
The  persistence of the Japanese  trade  and  current  account surplus  amply 
illustrates that balance of payments imbalances can be sustained for prolonged 
periods.  In  this  case  at  least  there  do  not  appear  to  be  any  dramatic 
mechanisms that eliminate imbalances in the short run.  But economists have 
long argued that continued current account surpluses cannot be consistent with 
a  sustainable long-run  equilibrium for the world economy. What adjustment 
mechanisms operate to close current account gaps in the long run? 
Traditional  trade-based  approaches  to  balance  of  payments  adjustment 
(Robinson,  1937; Machlup,  1939) stress  the  role of flexible international  rel- 
ative prices in trade adjustment. A trade imbalance reflects excess demand for 
the  goods  of one  country  and  excess  supply  of the  goods  of the  partner 
country.  Relative prices  will  change  to  eliminate  these excess demands.  The 
success and  speed of adjustment to long-run  balanced trade depends princip- 
ally on  trade  elasticities,  summarized  in  the familiar  Marshall-Lerner  condi- 
tion, as well as spending propensities of home and foreign residents. 
An explicit automatic adjustment mechanism is introduced in such models 
by imposing a  gold standard  specie-flow rule that  links  current  account sur- 
pluses  to  accumulation  of money  balances  from  abroad.  Accumulated  gold 
increases the domestic money supply, raising the price level and improving the 
terms  of trade.  The increasing  relative price of domestic goods then  reduces 
their excess demand and begins to close the current account surplus. Monetary 
approach authors (e.g. Frenkel and Johnson, 1976; Dornbusch, 1973) described 
a similar adjustment mechanism, but with money accumulation directly affect- 
ing expenditure levels, rather than relative prices. 
For  a  system  of floating  exchange  rates,  as  has  prevailed  among  major 
currencies  since  the  early  1970s,  relative  price  adjustment  may  be achieved 
primarily  through  changes  in  the  exchange  rate,  rather  than  national  price 
levels. But the basic adjustment question is the same: how much relative price 
adjustment will occur, and to what extent will this have the desired balance of 
payments impact. 
Writers of the "absorption approach" school (Alexander, 1952; Tsiang, 1961) 
generalized  the  elasticity model  to  incorporate  direct  and  induced  effects  of 
relative price change  on income and  absorption.  The multiplier  reduction in 
activity accompanying  a  terms  of trade  improvement,  for example,  tends  to 
limit  surplus reduction  by restraining  imports.  On the other hand,  the defla- 
tion associated with revaluation may raise real money balances and stimulate 
absorption, reinforcing current account adjustment. The literature identifies a 
large number of such effects, with no unambiguous net result for trade balance 
adjustment (see Pilbeam, 1992, pp. 65  71). 
Price elasticities remain key behavioral parameters governing adjustment in 
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an exchange devaluation or price level change) will improve the trade balance 
if  the  Marshall-Lerner  condition  holds,  that  is,  if  the  sum  of  domestic 
and  foreign  import  price  elasticities  exceeds  one. 2  Empirical  studies  have 
consistently supported the  Marshall-Lerner condition for industrialized eco- 
nomies,  including  the  US  and  Japan,  although  sometimes  only  after  a 
considerable lag. 3 The adverse "J-curve" movements of trade balances follow- 
ing a  terms of trade deterioration may last up to two years before the trade 
balance begins to improve (Artus and Knight, 1984). 
The inertia apparent in the US current account response to the 1986 dollar 
depreciation prompted a re-evaluation of traditional views about relative price 
and trade balance adjustment. Krugman (1987), Dornbusch (1987) and others 
hypothesized that price adjustment following a depreciation may be limited if 
exporting firms enjoy market power in destination countries. They may limit 
the  "pass  through" of exchange rates  into  export  prices  to  protect  market 
share. Dixit (1989) and Baldwin (1988) were among researchers who suggested 
that  dollar  depreciation  might  not  reverse  market  share  gains  made  by 
Japanese firms in the early 1980s. Having incurred substantial fixed costs in 
entering the US market, firms would be reluctant to leave unless very substan- 
tial  depreciation  occurred,  so  that  the  current  account  deficit  might  have 
experienced a permanent (hysteretic) increase during the dollar cycle. However, 
by the end  of the  decade, empirical evidence suggested to  some economists 
(Krugman, 1991) that price and current account responses may not have been 
so unusual after all, and that the traditional J-curve story seemed to hold fairly 
well in retrospect. 
In  the  elasticity-absorption approach  to  adjustment, there  is  little if any 
recognition that current account imbalances imply changing patterns of inter- 
national asset-holding. The modern portfolio-balance approach (Kouri, 1976; 
Obstfeld, 1981) explicitly recognizes  this link, and delineates its effect on ex- 
change rates.  A surplus country acquires net foreign assets. This both directly 
raises its wealth and disturbs its portfolio of assets. As investors reshuffle asset 
portfolios, their demands for currencies lead  to exchange rate  changes that, 
along with wealth changes, begin to close the current account surplus. 
While responsiveness to relative price changes may still play a role in asset- 
market adjustment models, an entirely new set of factors is in the foreground: 
the  preferences  of investors  over  alternative assets  and  the  response  of ex- 
change  rates  to  their  actions,  Current  account  adjustment may be  swift  if 
investors  in  surplus  countries  resist  accumulating foreign  assets  and  drive 
2The Marshall-Lerner condition is sufficient for trade balance improvement only if export  and 
import supply elasticities are infinite and if the initial trade balance is zero. For the more general 
case, see Robinson (1937). 
3See Goldstein and Khan (1985), and for a  recent survey, Hooper and Marquez (1993).  However, 
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foreign exchange rates down sharply. It may be quite slow if they are content 
to recycle foreign currency abroad. The changing willingness  of Japanese in- 
vestors to acquire dollar assets has been an important factor in the magnitude 
and timing of recent yen appreciations. The importance of central bank action 
is also transparent; central bank sterilization can prevent or delay adjustment 
by eliminating excess demands for currencies. 
The growth in the US current account deficit  in the mid-1980s  mirrored a 
surge in US investment relative to savings and sharply rising US government 
budget deficits. These events revived interest in the analysis of current account 
imbalances as the counterpart to savings-investment imbalances, a view that 
had earlier been emphasized by the absorption approach school. A number of 
economists (see especially Frenkel and Razin, 1992; Razin,  1993) constructed 
modern optimizing models of the world economy that illustrate the import- 
ance of consumer preferences  toward consumption and savings and govern- 
ment fiscal policies  for global trade patterns and international transmission. 
These models provide fundamental behavioral explanations for current account 
patterns  and  indicate how  changes  in  consumer  behavior  and  government 
policies might contribute to reduction in imbalances. 
4.  Why has the Japanese surplus persisted? 
The above review identifies mechanisms by which trade imbalances can be 
eliminated and factors affecting such  adjustment. We can draw  on  this dis- 
cussion to address the first  of our central questions: why has Japanese trade 
adjustment been so slow? 
Traditional models of trade and  current  account adjustment suggest that 
terms  of  trade  improvement  should  play  a  central  role  in  reducing  the 
Japanese surplus.  The effectiveness of yen appreciation in closing the current 
account gap will depend on the extent of real  exchange rate change and the 
behavioral response of Japanese consumers and firms, traditionally measured 
by import price elasticities.  In nominal terms the yen's appreciation after 1985 
was substantial, rising from 260 yen per dollar to 125 yen per dollar by 1988. 
But  real  yen appreciation was much less  pronounced. On  a  relative export 
price basis, the yen was dramatically undervalued prior to 1985, and remained 
significantly so even after its  1986 slide.  4 (NLI Research,  1993.) In addition, 
some  of the  yen's gains  were  reversed  temporarily during  1989  1990. The 
relative deflation of Japanese prices  may have resulted in part from differing 
domestic and foreign inflation conditions, and perhaps also pricing-to-market 
4Hooper and Marquez (1993) note that the trade-weighted average relative export price actually 
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behavior by Japanese exporters. Regardless of the cause, the effect was to yield 
terms-of-trade changes much smaller than is commonly believed. 
That there was little additional yen appreciation after 1985-1986  is surpris- 
ing  considering the  mounting Japanese  surplus.  The  asset  market  view  of 
foreign  exchange  argues  that  Japanese  investors  will  resist  accumulating 
foreign assets without an increase in foreign rates  of return, putting upward 
pressure on the yen. This portfolio adjustment process appears to have been 
impeded in the  1980s by unusually strong Japanese appetite for foreign (US) 
assets.  Until  1991-1992,  the Japanese surplus was almost entirely recycled as 
direct  foreign  investments  and  purchases  of other  long-term  foreign  asset. 
Since then, the Japanese financial crisis, recession,  and lower US dollar returns 
dramatically reduced Japanese interest in acquiring dollar assets and has shif- 
ted Japanese capital flows toward short-term outflows and foreign debt retire- 
ment. As portfolio balance models would suggest, with the redirection of asset 
demands  away  from  dollar  assets,  the  upward  movement  of  the  yen  has 
resumed. 
What real  appreciation that has occurred may have had limited effects on 
the  trade  surplus  because  of  the  relatively  weak  price  responsiveness  of 
Japanese trade flows.  While estimates vary considerably, price elasticities  of 
Japanese imports are frequently found to be smaller than for the US and other 
developed market economies.  5 This will limit the import surge associated with 
a  given  yen appreciation.  Business  cycle  developments have worked against 
relative price  effects. As noted above, fluctuations in economic activity have 
contributed to recent evolution of the Japanese surplus.  Imports surged and 
the trade balance receded with the strong pickup in demand in the late 1980s. 
Since  1990, weak Japanese demand has dampened absorption relative to in- 
come and permitted the trade imbalance to  widen.  In  the empirical section, 
below,  we  explore  both  the  sensitivity  of  the  imbalance  to  relative  price 
changes and the adjustment potential of a government stimulus to demand. 
To  some economists the  chief impediment to  Japanese  trade  adjustment 
remains the net savings shortfall in Western countries and surplus in Japan. 
On  the  surface this  observation is  a  tautology: current  account imbalances 
necessarily represent  savings-investment imbalances, without this  telling  us 
much about how savings and investment are determined. But proponents of 
this  view  generally have  two  culprits  in  mind: the  chronic  US  government 
budget  deficit  that  consumes  US  private  savings,  and  the  markedly lower 
private  savings  rate  in  the  US  compared  with  Japan.  Their  number  one 
5Hooper and Marquez (1993) report an average Japanese import price elasticity of  0.7 for five 
recent  studies  of Japanese  trade,  compared  with  average  US  elasticity  of  -0.9  in  ten  recent 
studies. For exports, they report an average Japanese elasticity of -  0.8, compared with an average 
for 8  US studies of  -0.9.  Their own estimates are  very close to these averages. They note that 
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prescription is  usually a  reduction in  US  deficit spending. 6 On  the flip side, 
any development that  encourages  a  reduction in  Japanese  net  savings  rates 
will  also  reduce  the  savings-investment  gap,  including  gradual  behavioral 
shifts toward consumption among the Japanese populace, or policies to stimu- 
late consumption such  as  measures  to  open Japanese  import markets.  Such 
structural change in Japan  has been aided by recent fiscal changes that have 
eliminated the Japanese public sector surplus. 
5.  Prospects for surplus reduction: A simulation analysis 
Recent  progress  in  eliminating  macroeconomic imbalances  may  produce 
further surplus  reduction. The Japanese portfolio reshuffling and  1993-1995 
yen appreciation may mean some trade adjustment is already "in the pipeline". 
Early success reducing the  US  structural  budget  deficit and  recent Japanese 
fiscal stimulus measures may also help by reducing savings-investment imbal- 
ances. How far will macroeconomic adjustments take us? Can macroeconomic 
policies alone close  the  trade  gap,  or  will  we  need  to  see more far-reaching 
structural change in the Japanese economy and its trade relationships? In this 
section we present a simulation model approach to answering these questions, 
focusing on two potential sources of adjustment: the recent sharp yen appreci- 
ation, and the possibility of additional fiscal stimulus in Japan. 
5.1.  The NIRA  model of the  US-Japan-world economy 
Econometric model analysis can contribute to the Japanese surplus  debate 
by providing quantitative estimates  of the impacts  of alternative adjustment 
measures.  Model  simulations  can  gauge  both  the  contributions  of macro- 
economic policy  to  surplus  reduction  and  macro  and  industry-level conse- 
quences.  Here  we  report  results  of a  simulation  study  of Japanese  surplus 
adjustment  conducted using  the  large-scale NIRA  model  of the  US-Japan- 
world economy. 
The  NIRA  US-Japan-LINK  model  combines  industrially  detailed 
econometric models  of the  US  and  Japan  within  the  global  framework  of 
Project LINK  to provide a  tool for consistent evaluation of macro and  sec- 
toral policies (Adams et al.,  1993a). 7 The US  and Japanese  models are com- 
6Ronald McKinnon has been among the most vocal proponents of this view. For an overview  of 
his debate with "traditional" trade economists  (played  here by William Cline) see The Economist 
(1993). 
7For a description of the Project LINK model, see Bodkin et al. (1991). F. G. Adams,  B. Gangnes / Japan  and the  World Economy  8 (1996) 309-333  317 
plete macroforecasting models of the two economies, linked through trade at 
the industry level, making the system an appropriate tool for evaluating both 
macro and industry-based measures to address the Japanese surplus problem. 
Although the primary focus of this exercise  is  on movements in the  overall 
trade balance, the  model  also provides information on  how the  burdens  of 
adjustment would be distributed across various sectors of the two economies. 
The NIRA system is an extension of two existing macromodels. It is based 
on  the  most recent version of a  large-scale model  of the  US,  the  Wharton 
Annual and Industry Forecasting Model (Preston, 1972; WEFA Group, 1982), 
a  traditional macromodel with an embedded flexible input-output system to 
determine  activity, employment and  prices  at  the  sectoral  level.  The  IUJ- 
Tsukuba model is used for Japan, an even larger model with a similar sectoral 
disaggregation. 
The US and Japanese models are linked directly through trade volumes and 
prices.  Following the  methodology of Project  LINK, behavioral  equations 
within each country model determine the country's real import demands and 
export prices;  these then determine partner-country export volumes and im- 
port prices.  Bilateral US-Japan  imports are determined in  a  two-stage pro- 
cess. First, overall import demand for each industry is computed as a function 
of industry demand and the relative import price.  For Japan, we have: 
Mi= f(~ ,D~,  IVi(-1)).  (1) 
Here P~ is the Japanese import price for industry i, p~A is the price of domestic 
production, and D~ is the final demand for industry output. The lagged invent- 
ory stock, IVi(- 1), is included in some equations to reflect increased imports 
that may occur when existing inventories are insufficient to meet demand. In a 
second step, the US share of Japanese industry imports is computed as a func- 
tion primarily of the relative price of US exports to total Japanese imports: 
PU  s 
The resulting Japanese demand for imports from the US, M~  us, represents  a part 
of industry export demand in the US model (along with demand originating in 
third countries, computed for more aggregate categories  in the LINK model). 
Japanese exports are similarly  computed as  the sum of US  and third-country 
demand for Japanese goods. A parallel linkage mechanism determines Japanese 
import prices as a weighted-average  of US and other country export prices. 
The behavioral trade equations and the system of bilateral linkages provide 
the central channel for the transmission of economic effects between the two 
economies and with the rest of the world (ROW). Within the US-Japan model, 
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that changes in imports and exports directly affect final demand for industry 
output and the indirect demand for the production of other industries. Output 
for industry i is given by 
X  i =  F i +  E i -  M  i +  ~, Xij,  (3) 
J 
where  F i  is  the  domestic  final  demand,  El-M~  the  net  export  demand, 
and  ZjXij the intermediate goods demand  of other sectors. Trade price and 
quantity changes at the industry level are also aggregated up to help determine 
key macroeconomic variables in the model. 
By integrating the US-Japan  model into the LINK system, we are able to 
capture the macroeconomic linkages between these two economies and the rest 
of the world. However, trade links to the RoW are modeled only at the four- 
category  level  of the  LINK  model,  and  are  then  allocated  proportionately 
across the detailed sectors of the US and Japanese models. Similarly, exports 
to the RoW are determined as fixed shares of world demand, as in other LINK 
country models. This means we are not able to compete between the US and 
Japan in third-country markets. 
The NIRA model solution determines a  globally consistent pattern of mer- 
chandise trade. 8 Trade adjustment is accomplished through national economic 
developments or  policy changes  that  alter import  demands,  trade  prices,  or 
trade shares (for the US and Japan).  For the most part, the automatic adjust- 
ment mechanisms described above are not modeled. For the short-to-medium 
term horizon of the analysis, trade prices are assumed to be set  by exporters 
and do not move to equilibrate trade. Exchange rates are currently treated as 
exogenous. Addition of an endogenous exchange rate subsystem would allow 
us  to  evaluate  the  yen's  inertia  in  the  face of growing  current  account  sur- 
pluses,  and  prospects  for further appreciation.  But  such  a  system  would  be 
difficult to implement because of the need to deal with asset holding decisions 
that are linked not just to relative rates of return but also to the balance sheet 
position of the Japanese financial system. 
Given an assumed change in exchange rate paths or other macroeconomic 
policies,  absorption  and  relative  price  movements  induce  changes  in  trade 
positions largely as described by the elasticity-absorption approach.  Income 
and  price elasticities  of trade equations  influence the  extent of trade  adjust- 
ment, as do the multiplier properties of the country models and the nature of 
inter-industry linkages. Under a yen appreciation, Japanese export price equa- 
tions incorporate varying degrees of pricing-to-market behavior, limiting the 
extent of actual relative price change. Changes  in  national price levels create 
aOther elements of the current account are modeled independently in the US, Japan and some 
other country models, but these flows may not move in a manner that is consistent across countries. F. G. Adam,s, B. Gangnes  / Japan and the World Economy 8 (1996) 309  333  319 
real money balance and wealth effects that further affect absorption and trade 
balance adjustment. 
5.2.  Macroadjustment simulations 
We evaluate macroeconomic policies for reducing the Japanese trade  sur- 
plus using forecast simulations of the NIRA model. The simulation analysis is 
conducted  by  first  establishing  a  baseline  forecast  simulation,  and  then 
re-solving the model with one or more exogenous policy changes. Simulation 
results  are  then  reported as  deviations from the  baseline  path.  We  describe 
characteristics of the baseline forecast below. We then present results for two 
alternative trade adjustment simulations: the  1993 yen appreciation, and  the 
yen appreciation combined with a domestic Japanese fiscal stimulus. 
5.2.1. The baseline simulation 
The baseline forecast simulation, shown in Table 1, reflects economic devel- 
opments  in  the  US,  Japan  and  world  economies through  early  1993, with 
forecasts for the rest of the decade broadly consistent with the consensus view 
of that time. (See Project LINK, 1993.) For the Japanese economy, the forecast 
reflects the  sharp  slowdown  that  occurred in  1992, followed by  a  recovery 
(more  than  a  bit  premature  in  our  forecast,  considering  developments  in 
1993  1995)  with the growth rate of gross national product (GNP) tending to 
the  3.5%  per  year  rate,  somewhat  lower  than  for  past  decades.  Inflation 
remains  low  to  nonexistent,  ranging  from  0%  to  2%  generally,  and  with 
slow growth the unemployment rate edges up slightly toward 4% late in the 
decade. 
The historically anemic economy and  continuing strong export growth to 
the US, Asia,  and other regions means the trade surplus continues to widen. 
Japanese real exports grow at a better than 5% average rate, real imports at a 
3% rate, so that the real trade balance deficit expands to 4% of GNP by 1999. 
The current account balance in dollars rises  from $123 billion to nearly $190 
billion over the forecast horizon. The baseline does not reflect the yen surge 
since  1993, but  rather  assumes  a  modest  1.5%  average  annual  rate  of yen 
appreciation between 1993 and  1999. 
For the US, the simulation shows the cyclical recovery of 1993  1994 and 
then a normal growth path averaging 2.4% GNP growth per year. The infla- 
tion rate ranges between 3%  and  5%  annually. The unemployment rate  re- 
mains  in  the  6-7%  range.  With  relatively  robust  growth  in  the  US  and 
abroad, and  no significant change in  the overall value of the dollar, real US 
exports and imports grow at  about  the same 4.5%  rate, so that the balance 
of trade  on  goods  and  services  stays  in  the  $40  billion  deficit  range,  and 
the current account deficit remains  under $90  billion.  Because of the  robust 320  F. G. Adams, B. Gangnes 
Table 1 
US  Japan-world baseline forecast 
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GNP(80Y billion)  380408.0  391877.0  404959.0  416800.0  497910.0  3.6 
Growth Rate (%)  1.5  3.0  3.3  2.9  5.1 
Normal GNP(Yb.)  465258.0  473213.0  491 553.0  519910.0  633875.0  4.2 
Cons. price inflation (%)  0.3  0.1  1.6  3.0  1.7  1.6" 
Unemployment rate (%)  3.1  3.3  3.4  3.6  4.0  3.6 
Y/$ exchange rate  128.8  126.9  125.1  123.2  116.1  -  1.9 
Real trade bal. 
G&S (80 Yb.)  2557.0  5976.0  7735.0  7003.0  19 735.0  10 327.5* 
Exports  75 793.0  79 992.0  84 482.0  85 960.0  l 11 826.0  5.3 
Imports  73 236.0  74 016.0  76 746.0  78 957.0  92 091.0  3.0 
Nominal trade bal. (Yb.)  16 121.0  17864.0  18 904,0  20587.0  22088.0  20 139.3" 
Current account ($b.)  123.0  138.6  149.1  165.0  188.2  163.2" 
United States 
GNP (725 billion)  1911.6  1968.5  2025.0  2081.4  2281.2  2.4 
Growth rate (%)  1.2  3.0  2.9  2.8  2.4 
Nominal GNP($b.)  5861.6  6218.9  6578.4  7074.4  9343.3  6.5 
Cons. price inflation (%)  2.4  3.5  3.4  5.3  4.2  4.3* 
Unemployment rate (%)  7.1  7.3  6.7  6.5  7.0  6.7 
W. ave. exch. rate  98.9  98.7  98.8  99.0  99.4  0.1 
Real trade bal. 
G&S (725b.)  -  24.2  -  24.5  -  24.6  -  25.3  -  41.1  -  29.8* 
Exports  194.7  204.9  215.1  224.5  260.5  4.4 
Imports  218.9  229.3  239.6  249.8  301.6  4.7 
Current account ($b.)  -  65.4  -  58.4  -  60.1  -  63.4  -  89.4  -  69.1" 
World 
Nominal exports ($b.)  3882.8  4226.8  4586.8  4964.6  6758.0  8.3 
Other indust, countries  1960.1  2134.7  2318.6  2510.7  3444.6  8.5 
Developing countries  820.5  883.2  951.9  1020.7  1342.2  7.7 
Real exports (705b.)  904.7  962.4  1015.1  1067.6  1306.3  5.4 
*Average level of series. 
performance  of the  US  service  sector,  these  figures  mask  deterioration  in  the 
merchandise  trade  deficit, which  exceeds  $160  billion by the decade's end. 
5.2.2.  Yen appreciation 
Between January  and  August  1993, the Yen appreciated  significantly against 
major  currencies;  against  the  dollar,  the  yen  rose  from  about  126  yen  per 
dollar  to  104  yen  per  dollar,  a  change  of  17%.  Since  then,  it  has,  of course, F. G. Adams, B. Gangnes  / Japan and the World Economy 8 (1996) 309  333  321 
appreciated further by an almost equal amount in percentage terms. 9 Such  a 
substantial increase in the value of the yen may have the potential to signific- 
antly  reduce  the  trade  surplus,  perhaps  after  a  prolonged  J-curve  improve- 
ment. Here, we have imposed the yen appreciation as an exogenous shift in the 
yen/dollar exchange rate, so that we can evaluate its potential for reducing the 
trade imbalance. 1° 
Table  2  shows  the  impact  of  the  yen  appreciation  on  important  macro 
variables in Japan,  the US  and the rest of the world.  Table 3 shows  regional 
changes  in  merchandise  trade  flows,  and  Table  4  reports  employment  and 
output  effects in  selected industries.  Unless  indicated,  the figures given repre- 
sent  differences  and  percent  differences  from  the  baseline  model  simulation. 
Looking first at the Japan panel of Table  1, the appreciation is seen to make 
modest  headway  in  reducing  the  Japanese  surplus.  After  a  J-curve 
improvement  of about  $1  billion  in  1993,  the  Japanese  merchandise  trade 
balance declines steadily so that it is $19 billion below baseline levels by 1999. 
Because  of positive  valuation  effects  on  service  exports,  the  service  balance 
rises moderately, so that the broader current account falls by $13  billion over 
the forecast horizon. 
These  limited  changes  in  the  dollar  trade  balance  mask  more  dramatic 
adjustments in yen-denominated flows. Measured in yen, the balance on goods 
and services (including factor income/receipts) is ¥ 4.7 trillion lower by 1999,  a 
reduction  of 21%.  Real exports  decline  nearly  10%,  contributing  to  a  sharp 
reduction in the GNP growth rate. These significant adjustments in yen terms 
are  nearly  overcome  by  the  large  positive  valuation  effects  associated  with 
revaluing the huge initial surplus in now-smaller dollars. 
While  Japanese  real  exports  fall  dramatically,  real  import  demand  is  little 
different from the baseline.  Imports rise less than  1.5%  in current  dollars,  and 
actually fall slightly in real terms. By comparison, US imports fall by a full 2.4% 
even though  the  weighted-average dollar  is  only 4%  lower.  This  result  comes 
from a  combination  of limited Japanese import price responsiveness  and  from 
the negative effects on import demand of falling Japanese economic activity. 
The importance of trade price responsiveness for trade adjustment was em- 
phasized in the theoretical section, above. Like many other studies of Japanese 
trade,  behavioral import  equations  in  our  model  have  small  estimated  price 
9However, just  prior to  this writing (mid-1995) the  yen swung sharply lower in  response to 
coordinated intervention by the  central banks of Japan+ the  US  and  Germany, perhaps also 
correcting earlier overshooting in the positive direction. 
1°Because the  yen/dollar exchange rate  is  adjusted directly, without changing underlying 
Japanese or US monetary policy, the  scenario should be viewed as a nonpolicy appreciation 
resulting, for example, from a change in investors' expectations or fundamental asset preferences. 
Note that since the dollar is the numeraire currency for the LINK model, the simulated change 
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Table 2 
Macroeconomic  and trade effects of yen appreciation 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1999 
Japan 
GNP(80Y  billion)  -  5586.2  -  13897.2  -  17210.5  -  18386.5  -20462.7 
%Difference  -  1.4  -  3.4  -  4.1  -  4.3  -  4.1 
Nominal GNP  (Yb.)  -  7635.9  -  20 572.7  -  29 495.6  -  33 646.6  -  40 274.9 
Cons. price inflation (%)  -  1.3  -  2.9  -  3.5  -  3.8  -  6.1 
Y/$ exchange rate (%)  -  9.0  -  17.1  -  17.1  -  17.1  -  17.1 
Real trade bal. G&S (80 Yb.)  -  3933.1  -  8097.2  -- 7747.2  -  7965.6  -  10 278.1 
Exports  -  3891.9  -  8035.4  -  7970.6  -  8539.0  -  10690.3 
%Difference  -  4.9  -  9.5  -  9.3  -  9.5  -  9.6 
Imports  41.2  61.8  -  223.4  -  573.4  -  412.2 
% Difference  0.1  0.1  -  0.3  -  0.7  -  0.4 
Nominal trade bal. (Yb.)  -  1487.0  -  3332.0  -  4046.0  -  4207.0  -  4685.0 
Current account ($b.)  2.4  -  0.9  -  5.0  -  6.6  -  13.2 
Nominal merchandise balance  1.2  -  2.1  -  8.6  -  11.0  -  19.4 
Nominal service/other balance  1.2  3.0  3.6  3.4  6.2 
United States 
GNP  (725 billion)  0.9  4.1  6.9  8.8  9.0 
%Difference  0.0  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.4 
Nominal GNP  ($b.)  3.7  18.4  38.7  62.6  124.9 
Cons. price inflation (%)  0.1  0.3  0.4  0.6  1.1 
W. ave. exch. rate (%)  1.9  3.8  3.8  3.8  3.8 
Real trade bal. G&S (725b.)  1.5  3.3  3.9  5.1  6.6 
Exports  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.0  -  0.8 
%Difference  0.2  0.3  0.1  0.0  -  0.3 
Imports  -  1.1  -  2.6  -  3.6  -  5.1  -  7.3 
% Difference  -0.5  -  1.1  -  1.5  -  1.9  -2.4 
Current account ($b.)  -  3.0  -  3.9  0.9  4.3  11.6 
Nominal merchandise balance  -  1.4  -  0.7  4.1  7.9  14.9 
Nominal service/other balance  -  1.6  -  3.2  -  3.2  -  3.6  -  3.3 
World 
Gross national product (%)  0.0  -  0.1  0.1  -  0.1  -  0.2 
Real exports (70 Sb.)  -  1.5  -  3.0  -  4.5  -  6.6  -  8.8 
Nominal exports ($b.)  18.5  34.2  25.2  23.1  30.9 
Note:  Figures are differences and percent differences from the baseline simulation. 
elasticities  -  the  implied  weighted-average  elasticity  for  all  goods  is just  -  0.2. 
With  the  decline  in  relative  import  prices  of  12%,  we  can  expect  to  see  at  most 
a  2.5%  increase  in  real  imports.  Even  this  limited  import  response  does  not 
materialize,  because  of  the  negative  income  effects  of  yen  appreciation.  Led  by 
the  drop  in  exports,  GNP  declines  by  4%  by  1999.  The  deflationary  effect  of 
this  drop  in  demand  more  than  offsets  the  increased  price  competitiveness  of 
imports  so  that  real  imports  remain  near  baseline  levels. F. G. Adams,  B. Gangnes  / Japan and the World Econom.v 8 (1996) 309  333 
Table 3 
Effect of yen appreciation on regional merchandise trade flows 
323 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1999  1999 Percent 
Difference 
Japan 
Exports  3.3  1.7  -  5.5  -  8.5  -  14.7  -  2.2 
Imports  2.1  3.8  3.1  2.5  4.7  1.2 
Balance  1.2  -  2.1  -  8.6  -  11.0  -  19.4 
Exports to the US  0.9  -2.8  -9.5  -12.8  -20.2  -2.2 
Imports from the US  0.7  1.2  0.8  0.7  1.5  1.5 
Balance  0.3  -4.0  -  10.3  -  13.5  -21.7 
United States 
Exports  2.6  5.1  4.7  5.11  8.0  1.0 
Imports  4.0  5.9  0.5  2.9  6.9  -  0.7 
Balance  -  1.4  -0.7  4.1  7.9  14.9 
Exports to Japan  0.7  1.2  0.8  I).7  1.5  1.5 
Imports from Japan  0.9  -  2.8  -  9.5  -  12.9  -  20.3  -  8.3 
Balance  -  0.3  4.0  10.3  13.5  21.8 
Other industrailized 
countries 
Exports  8.9  18.3  17.1  17.5  23.5  0.7 
Imports  6.7  12.5  10.9  11.5  15.1  0.4 
Balance  2.2  5.8  6.2  6.0  8.4 
Developing economies 
Exports  3.1  7.8  7.7  7.6  11.5  0.9 
Imports  6.0  11.4  10.3  11.6  15.8  1.3 
Balance  -- 3.0  -  3.6  -  2.5  4.0  -  4.3 
Former cent.-planned 
economies 
Exports  1.8  3.8  3.7  3.8  5.2  1.1 
Imports  2.3  4.5  4.0  4.2  4.8  1.3 
Balance  -  0.5  0.6  0.3  -  0.4  0.4 
World total exports  18.5  34.2  25.2  23.1  30.9  0.5 
Note:  Figures are differences from baseline simulation levels in billions  of current dollars.  For 1999, the 
percent difference from the baseline is also reported. 
The  important  offsetting effect  of economic  contraction  on  trade  balance 
adjustment  was anticipated by absorption  school writers, and has  been noted 
for Japan  in previous studies. Yoshitomi (1991)  points out that "general equi- 
librium" trade price elasticities are  much  smaller than  the partial  equilibrium 
elasticities of import  equations,  so  that,  "the  potential  external  account  [de- 
terioration]  due  to  export  and  import  price  changes  alone  is  considerably 
offset by endogenized changes in  incomes and prices" (p.  129),  This point  has 
also  been made  by  McKinnon  (1993)  and  others in  their  recent critiques of a 
"weak dollar policy" for reducing the US-Japan  trade imbalance. 324  F. G. Adams, B. Gangnes / Japan and the World Economy 8 (1996) 309-333 
Table 4 
Effect of yen appreciation on selected industries 
Difference in gross output (%)  Difference in employment (thous.) 
1994  1999  1994  1999 
Japan 
Rubber products  -  13.5  -  13.2  -  5.8  -  9.5 
Chemicals  -  3,1  -  4.2  -  2.6  -  1.2 
Fabricated metal products  -  4.0  -  4.0  -  12.9  -  14.1 
Nonelectrical machinery  -  8.7  -  9.8  -  51.5  -  79.6 
Electrical machinery  -  5.0  -  5.2  -  41.3  -  50.6 
Automobiles  -  6.5  -  10.5  -  4.8  -  35.3 
Housing, construction  -  1.9  -  2.3  -  32.7  -  84.5 
Wholelsale, retail  -  1.1  -  2.7  -  8.3  -  107.6 
Personal services  -  0.5  -  1.6  -  62.9  -  238.8 
Total  -  2.1  -  2.8  -  323.9  -  821.6 
United States 
Mining  0.4  0.7  0.0  0.0 
Rubber and plastics  0.5  0.7  2.6  7.2 
Primary metals  0.7  1.6  4.5  25.1 
Fabricated metal products  0.6  1.0  8.0  29.7 
Nonelectrical machinery  0.6  0.6  17.7  44.9 
Electrical machinery  I. 1  3.0  13.5  44.7 
Automobiles  0.9  3.4  3.7  23.5 
Transportation services  0.3  0.4  4.1  19.1 
Wholesale, retail  0.1  0.2  6.4  65.2 
Personal services  0.1  0.3  8.0  100.9 
Manufactures total  0.5  1.0  90.0  415.7 
Note:  Figures are differences from baseline values. For real gross output, the percent difference is given; 
for employment, the difference in thousands of employees is reported. 
Larger estimated price elasticities would generate bigger trade changes un- 
der  the  yen appreciation.  In  recent  years,  some economists have  speculated 
that Japanese import demand might indeed have become more price sensitive, 
as a  result of changes in consumer preferences, and liberalization  of domestic 
and  import  markets.  Our  trade  model  is  based  on  data  through  only  the 
mid-1980s, so an  updated  trade model could very well yield higher elasticity 
estimates  and  more responsive imports.  However, the evidence on  elasticity 
changes in  Japanese trade suggests that  while import  demand  may be more 
price elastic, exports have likely become less so, with the net effect that  trade 
adjustment is more limited than in the past (see for example, Moriguchi,  1993; 
Ochi and Utsunomiya, 1993). 
Table  3  shows changes  in  US-Japan  bilateral  merchandise  trade  and  in 
merchandise  trade by other world regions.  A  result  worth noting  is that  the F. G. Adams, B. Gangnes  / Japan and the World Economy 8 (•996)  309 -333  325 
sharp decline in Japanese exports is completely (indeed more than completely) 
accounted for by the decline in exports to the US market. That the US-Japan 
bilateral balance sees most of the trade adjustment is no accident. In part, this 
is the result of the high price sensitivity of US import demand and the relative 
size of the US market. But it also stems from the structure of the NIRA model 
system.  As  noted  above,  RoW  imports  are  modeled  using  standard  LINK 
methodology which applies  a  fixed trade share matrix to allocate a  vector of 
world import demands across  exporting countries.  As a  result,  RoW countries 
cannot  substitute  away from Japanese  imports  when  the  yen appreciates.  In 
fact  higher  dollar  Japanese  export  prices  actually  raise  their  import  bill, 
reflected  in  the  small  observed  increases  in  Japanese dollar exports  to  RoW 
countries.  For many RoW countries, particularly in East Asia, this may not be 
unrealistic. 
On the strength of its sharp decline in merchandise imports from Japan and 
increased  export  competitiveness, the  US  achieves  a  $15  billion  dollar  im- 
provement in its merchandise trade balance by the decade's end. US importers 
shift decisively  away from Japanese suppliers,  so that most of the $20 billion 
drop in imports from Japan is replaced by imports from RoW countries. The 
resulting  improvement  in  the  bilateral  trade  balance  between  the  US  and 
Japan is almost $22 billion.  US trade balance gains result in general expansion 
of the economy; GNP is one-half percent higher by 1999. 
An  important point  from a  political perspective is  that  the effects of yen 
appreciation are  not distributed  uniformly across  industries in  the Japanese 
and US economies. As shown in Table 4, export-dependent Japanese sectors 
like automobiles and machinery are particularly hard hit, and their suppliers 
(for  example  rubber  products  and  metals)  also  suffer.  Many of these  same 
sectors  expand  in  the  US  as  American  producers  gain  market  share  from 
Japanese  exporters.  Overall,  employment falls  by  over  800000  workers  in 
Japan, while rising half that in the US. 
5.2.3.  Yen appreciation  with fiscal stimulus 
Fiscal policy has the potential to alter the trade balance by directly affecting 
the level of expenditure relative to income, or net national savings relative to 
investment. Additional fiscal expansion in Japan might be a sensible  counter- 
part to adjustment through yen appreciation, because it  could help to offset 
the adverse domestic macroeconomic consequences of appreciation while con- 
tributing to further surplus reduction. 
Fiscal  stimulus  has  been  at  the  center  of the  Japanese  economic  policy 
debate in recent years. With the Japanese slowdown and the surge in the trade 
surplus, there has been increasing pressure from both inside and outside Japan 
for a strong fiscal response. Several  packages of spending increases  and other 
measures have been implemented since  1992; the largest of these,  enacted in 
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in  public  works  spending  and  programs  to  support  the  land  market  and 
banking institutions. The yen appreciation has strengthened the hand of those 
advocating  significant  expansionary  policies  to  prevent  a  more  severe 
economic downturn, though officials have been reluctant to extend more than 
modest temporary fiscal stimulus measures. 
In this section, we simulate the adoption of a fiscal stimulus together with 
the yen appreciation analyzed above. The stimulus applied has been chosen 
purposely as  the  stimulus needed  to just  offset  the  adverse macroeconomic 
Table  5 
Macroeconomic  and  trade  effects of yen appreciation  with fiscal stimulus 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1999 
Japan 
GNP  (80Y billion)  600.4  748.1  560.6  1066.4  -  415.9 
%  Difference  0,2  0.2  0.1  0.2  -  0.1 
Nominal  GNP  (Yb.)  -  1755.6  -  5722.1  -  9311.7  -  9250.3  -  8984.9 
Cons.  price  inflation  (%)  -  1.6  -  3.4  -  3.7  -  3.8  -  3.5 
Y/$ exchange  rate (%)  -  9.0  -  17.1  -  17.1  -  17.1  -  17.l 
Read  trade  bal.  G&S  (80Yb.)  -  440Z2  -  9746.0  -  10 180.9  -  10721.1  -  13 571.2 
Exports  -  3850,8  -  8094.7  -  8197.2  -  8845.2  -  11 045.4 
%  Difference  -  4.8  -  9.6  -  9.5  -  9.8  -  9.9 
Imports  551.4  1651.2  1983.7  1875.9  2525.7 
%  Difference  0.7  2.2  2.5  2.3  2.7 
Nominal  trade  bal. (Yb.)  -  1815.0  -  4247.0  -  5272.0  -  5594.0  -  6451.0 
Current  account  ($b.)  0.0  -  6.1  -  14.0  -  17.7  -  26.2 
Nominal  merchandise  balance  -  1.0  -  8.6  -  16.9  -  20.3  -  31.3 
Nominal  service/other  balance  1.0  2.5  2.9  2.6  5.1 
United  States 
GNP  (725  billion)  1.4  5.5  9.0  11.3  11.5 
%  Difference  0.1  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.5 
Nominal  GNP  ($b.)  5.3  23.6  48.3  77.3  154.1 
Cons.  price inflation  (%)  0.1  0.3  0.5  0.7  1.3 
W. ave. exch.  rate (%)  1.9  3.8  3.8  3.8  3.8 
Real trade  bal.  G&S  (725b.)  1.6  3.8  4.7  6.0  7.6 
Exports  0.6  1.3  1.2  0.9  0.1 
%  Difference  0.3  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.1 
Imports  -  1.0  -  2.5  -  3.6  -  5.1  -  7.4 
%  Difference  -  0.4  -  1.0  -  1.4  -  1.9  -  2.5 
Current  account  ($b.)  -  2.0  -  1.3  4.2  8.1  16.4 
Nominal  merchandise  balance  ~  0.7  1.0  6.4  10.4  18.2 
Nominal  service/other  balance  -  1.3  -  2.3  -  2.2  -  2.3  -  1.8 
World 
Gross  national  product  (%)  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.2 
Real exports  (705b.)  -0.7  -  1.1  -  2.0  -  3.8  -  6.2 
Nominal  exports  ($b.)  21.4  44.0  41.3  42.7  56.9 
Note:  Figures  are differences and  percent  differences from  the baseline simulation. F. G. Adams. B. Gangnes  / Japan and the World Economy 8 (1996) 309  333  327 
impact  of  the  yen  rise.  Real  Japanese  government  investment  is  raised  by 
about  ¥  6  trillion per  year (about  1.5%  of GNP),  sufficient  stimulus  to  return 
real  output  roughly  to  its pre-appreciation  path. 
Tables  5  and  6  show  the  macroeconomic  and  trade  effects  of  the  yen 
appreciation  and  fiscal  stimulus.  The  fiscal  policy  leads  to  some  additional 
reduction  in the trade surplus. The spending  increase offsets the contractionary 
income  effect  of yen  appreciation  on  import  demand,  so  that  real  imports  of 
goods  and  services  rise  by  2.7%.  The  dollar  Japanese  merchandise  trade  bal- 
ance  falls  an  additional  $12  billion,  so  that  it  is  $31  billion  below  baseline 
levels  by  the end  of the century.  US  exporters  see  $4  billion  of this  increased 
demand,  so  that  the  bilateral  US  trade  balance  deficit  with  Japan  shrinks  by 
that  additional  increment. 
Table 6 
Effect on regional merchandise trade flows of yen appreciation with fiscal stimulus 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1999  1999 Percent 
Difference 
Japan 
Exports  3.3  2.0  -4.7  7.5  -  13.4  -2.1 
Imports  4.2  10.6  12.2  12.8  17.9  4.4 
Balance  -  1.0  -  8.6  16.9  -  20.3  31.3 
Exports to the US  0.8  3.t)  --9.6  13.1  20.8  -8.5 
Imports from the US  1.3  3.2  3.5  3.5  4.9  4.7 
Balance  0.5  -6.2  13.1  -  16.6  -25.7 
United States 
Exports  3.4  7.6  8.3  9.2  13.5  1.7 
Imports  4.1  6.7  1.9  1.3  -4.7  -0.5 
Balance  -  0.7  1.0  6.4  10.4  18.2 
Exports to Japan  1.3  3.2  3.5  3.4  4.9  4.7 
Imports from Japan  0.8  3.0  -- 9.7  13.2  -  20.8  -  8.4 
Balance  0.5  6.2  13.1  16.6  25.7 
Other industrailized countries 
Exports  9.7  21.6  22.7  24.6  32.3  0.9 
Imports  6.8  13.8  13.5  15.1  19.7  0.5 
Balance  2.8  7.8  9.2  9.5  12.6 
Developing economies 
Exports  4.3  11.3  13.4  14.6  20.7  1.5 
Imports  6.1  12.6  12.9  15.4  22.1  1.8 
Balance  1.8  -  1.3  0.5  -  0.8  1.4 
Former cent.-planned economies 
Exports  2.0  4.7  5.2  5.6  7.6  1.6 
Imports  2.5  5.2  5.3  5.8  6.9  1.8 
Balance  -0.4  -0.4  -0.1  0.2  0.7 
World total exports  21.4  44.1  41.3  42.7  56.9  (I.8 
Note:  Figures are differences from baseline simulation levels in billions of current dollars.  For 1999, the 
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While  restoring  aggregate  output  to  its  original  baseline  path,  the  general 
fiscal  stimulus is not able to prevent losses in Japan to heavily trade-dependent 
industries.  In  Table  7,  autos and machinery experience  net declines  in  output 
and employment. Other industries,  particularly  construction and service  sectors 
benefit  more from increased demand and see output and employment gains. 
The  moderate  fiscal  stimulus  imposed  in  this  simulation  generates  only 
limited  additional  improvement  in  the  trade  imbalance.  A  larger  stimulus 
designed  to jump  start  the  Japanese  economy  could  provide  larger  trade 
adjustment gains,  at least in  the short run.  Our effects  likely  underestimate 
trade balance  changes  under the stimulus because  they do not permit addi- 
tional  endogenous  yen  adjustment.  Once  the  stimulative  effect  of  fiscal 
spending on  Japanese  interest  rates  is taken  into  account,  we might  expect 
to  see  still  further  appreciation  of  the  yen,  and  some  additional  trade 
rebalancing. 
Table 7 
Effect on selected industries of yen appreciation with fiscal stimulus 
Difference in gross output (%)  Difference in employment (thous.) 
1994  1999  1994  1999 
Japan 
Rubber products  -  10.2  -  11.3  -  3.9  -  7.1 
Chemicals  -  1.1  -  1.9  0.3  1.8 
Fabricated metal products  1.1  1.8  -  0.1  0.6 
Nonelectrical machinery  -  5.4  -  5.7  -  34.0  -  51.3 
Electrical machinery  1.4  0.6  12.3  11.3 
Automobiles  -  3.9  -  7.8  -  2.9  -  25.1 
Housing, construction  6.8  5.3  52.2  87.6 
Wholelsale, retail  0.4  -  0.3  6.1  -  10.5 
Personal services  0.9  1.0  -  42.3  1.2 
Total  1.0  0.8  0.5  50.1 
United States 
Mining  0.6  0.8  0.0  0.0 
Rubber and plastics  0.6  0.9  3.1  9.1 
Primary metals  0.8  1.8  5.8  30.0 
Fabricated metal products  0.7  1.1  9.1  33.2 
Nonelectrical machinery  0.7  0.6  20.2  53.7 
Electrical machinery  1.2  3.3  15.0  48.6 
Automobiles  1.1  3.9  4.7  26.8 
Transportation services  0.4  0.6  6.2  25.8 
Wholesale, retail  0.1  0.3  15.9  101.8 
Personal services  0.1  0.4  12.8  134.0 
Manufactures total  0.6  1.1  122.5  540.2 
Note:  Figures are differences from baseline values.  For real gross output, the percent difference is given; 
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5.3.  Comparison to previous studies 
Comparison of our results to those of other recent studies of Japanese trade 
balance  adjustment are  complicated by  differences  in  analytical framework 
and  scenario  design.  Unlike  the  present  analysis, many studies  use  partial 
equilibrium  export  and  import  equation  estimates  to  gauge  trade  balance 
adjustment. There are differences in the manner in which exchange rate change 
is assumed to occur, as well as the nature of fiscal stimuli. To our knowledge, 
there are also a  relatively limited number of published studies that focus on 
Japanese adjustment, unlike the large number of studies looking at the prob- 
lem  from the US perspective.  Ito (1994) looks at the contribution of several 
factors to  recent movements in  the  Japanese  balance of payments. Using  a 
partial equilibrium trade model, he finds that a hypothetical movement of the 
yen from  125¥/$  in  1989 to  100¥,/$ by late  1991 would  have  reduced  the 
current account surplus by $25  billion.  This estimate is very close  to that of 
Hooper and Marquez (1993), who estimate that every 10%  yen appreciation 
reduces the surplus by $10 billion after five years. Even larger estimates come 
from Cline (1993), who predicts a $4 billion adjustment in the Japanese current 
account for every 1% appreciation of the yen. 
Our  estimates  are  about  half as  large  as  those  of Ito,  and  Hooper  and 
Marquez. We predict that the  17%  yen appreciation of 1993 will reduce the 
real Japanese trade surplus by ¥ 8 trillion (1980 yen) after four years, about 2% 
of baseline GNP, with the reduction in the dollar current account only $6.6 
billion over this time period. This result is actually very close to that obtained 
by Corker (1989). In counter-factual simulations for the late  1980s, he finds 
that a 40% appreciation of the yen yields a ¥ 9 trillion reduction in the current 
account (2.5%  of GNP), but only a $3 billion reduction in the dollar balance 
because of large offsetting J-curve valuation effects. 
The  range  of trade adjustment estimates is  considerable, with  our  results 
clearly at the low end among the studies discussed here. The variety of estim- 
ates of yen appreciation effects appears to be attributable in part to differences 
in estimated trade price  elasticities  across models, and to differences  between 
partial  and  general  equilibrium  modeling approaches.  Empirical  studies  of 
trade adjustment that ignore equilibrium reductions in economic activity ac- 
companying yen appreciation will likely overestimate the extent of adjustment. 
In our model, these changes limit considerably the rise  in Japanese imports 
and the consequent reduction of the Japanese current account. 
The estimated trade adjustment from a Japanese fiscal expansion is similar 
in the present study and other recent analyses. We find that a  1.5%  of GNP 
fiscal  stimulus creates an additional half percent of GNP  real trade balance 
reduction  after  four  years,  and  an  additional  $11  billion  reduction  in  the 
Japanese current account. Balassa and Noland (1988) report Federal Reserve 
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(1%  of gross  domestic product,  GDP,  or  about  $20  billion dollars at  1987 
exchange rates)  would reduce the Japanese surplus by $1.5-$5.9 billion.  Their 
own estimate falls  between these two figures.  Allowing for economic growth 
and exchange rate changes since the late 1980s, these estimates imply a  1% of 
GDP stimulus today would create about a  $4-$15  billion Japanese current 
account reduction. Similarly, Cline (1989) estimates that  1%  faster Japanese 
economic growth for the single  year 1992 would reduce the trade surplus by 
$3.2 billion (p.  211), and  McKibben and Sachs  (1991) estimate that a  1%  of 
GDP stimulus would reduce the Japanese current account by 0.5% of GDP in 
real  terms.  In  at  least  some  of these  studies,  fiscal  expansion leads  to  yen 
appreciation that reinforces trade balance adjustment; endogenous exchange 
rate adjustment is not modeled in the scenarios we have presented here. 
6.  Conclusions 
In  this  paper  we  have  described  the  development of the  Japanese  trade 
surplus and evaluated prospects for trade balance adjustment. By viewing the 
surplus problem in the light of theoretical models of international adjustment, 
we have identified sources of the surplus's stubborn persistence and prerequis- 
ites for its solution. Using simulations of the NIRA model of the US-Japan- 
World economy, we have then measured the potential adjustment gains from 
exchange rate change and fiscal stimulus in Japan. 
Exchange appreciation  will  be  only moderately effective  in  reducing  the 
Japanese trade surplus. Model simulations of the recent yen surge suggest the 
trade balance would fall  by $19  billion dollars below  baseline levels  by the 
decade's end as a result of the terms of trade improvement. While this change 
is not dramatic, the lion's share of this adjustment may occur in the politically 
sensitive  US-Japan bilateral balance. 
Fiscal expansion in Japan can also contribute to  reducing the surplus.  In 
fact, an accompanying fiscal stimulus is important if yen appreciation is to be 
fully effective.  The  general  equilibrium  impact  of falling income  limits  the 
extent of trade adjustment under a  yen appreciation. By combining appreci- 
ation with a general fiscal stimulus, gains in trade rebalancing can be achieved 
without adverse effects on GNP. In our simulation, a fiscal stimulus sufficient 
to  maintain  baseline  economic  growth  rates  would  reduce  the  surplus  an 
additional $12 billion dollars by 1999. 
The  appreciation of the  yen to  date,  and  a  modest fiscal  expansion, will 
clearly not eliminate the trade surplus problem. By our forecast, the Japanese 
currelat  account balance would still  rise  to above $150 billion by  1999. Even 
with  a  stronger-than-expected cyclical  recovery in Japan,  the surplus  might 
remain in the $80-$100 billion range. Additional macroeconomic adjustments 
would then be necessary. In particular, we would expect to see further substan- F. G, Adams, B. Gangnes / Japan and the World Economy 8 (1996) 309  333  331 
tial yen appreciation over the balance of the decade. Persisting foreign political 
pressure might spur further fiscal expansion in Japan as well. 
A  number  of writers  have questioned  the  potential  for  traditional  macro- 
economic  solutions  to  the  Japanese  surplus  problem.  Fundamentally  closed 
markets  or  hysteretic  effects  of past  policies  may  thwart  adjustment  by ex- 
change appreciation or fiscal stimulus. Certainly our simulations  suggest that 
very large macropolicy changes would be necessary to close the trade gap. The 
alternatives  to  macroeconomic  approaches  involve  structural  change  in  Ja- 
pan's trade  relationships with  other countries.  Some such changes are under- 
way already, and account for significant growth of Japanese real imports in the 
past two years. On the demand side, retail market development and increased 
access for foreign goods is stimulating consumption of imports. On the supply 
side, Japanese firms are  increasingly replacing domestic production  with  im- 
ports  from  low-cost  production  platforms  in  China  and  South  East  Asia. 
Additional  measures to  open Japanese markets,  and  continuing  evolution  of 
Japanese  consumption/savings  patterns,  might  be  necessary  to  eliminate  the 
remaining  trade  imbalance. 11  Quantitative  analyses  of  trade  balance  gains 
likely  from  these  structural  changes  are  needed  as  a  counterpart  to  macro- 
economic policy simulation studies. 
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